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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment Protects
Houses of Worship from Restrictive Zoning Ordinances.-In 1970, the
Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore, Inc., purchased
property in the Village of Roslyn Harbor, New York for the purpose of using
the estate house located on the property as a house of worship. The estate
house was located twenty-nine feet back from the property line. This was in
conflict with an ordinance of the Village of Roslyn Harbor which required
that all religious uses be set back at least one hundred feet.'
The synagogue applied to the village zoning board for a variance of the one
hundred foot setback requirement. This was denied by the board on the
ground that it lacked authority to grant the variance. 2 The zoning board
further asserted that, even if it had the power to grant the variance, it would
have denied a special permit to convert the estate to a house of worship. 3 The
present action was a challenge by the synagogue to the constitutionality of the
village's ordinances which provided for the one hundred foot setback 4 and
empowered the zoning board to deny the special use permit upon a determina-
tion that the religious use would have detrimental effects. s The New York
Court of Appeals found these ordinances to be an unconstitutional exercise of
the police power in that they "restrict[ed] religious uses without recognizing
their special, protected status under the First Amendment." 6 Jewish Recon-
1. The ordinance refers to permits for "any district churches, public and parochial primary
and secondary schools and clubs not operated for a profit. ... No such building shall be erected
or be used for such purposes within one hundred and fifty (M0) feet of any street line nor within
one hundred (100) feet of any property line." Roslyn Harbor, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance § 11-2.14,
May 14, 1958.
2. In re Jewish Reconstructionist Socy, (Roslyn Harbor Zoning Bd. of Appeals, Nov. 3,
1971).
3. Id. at 13. The board would have denied the permit "because of the synagogue's potential
effect on traffic and because there was insufficient water pressure in nearby fire hydrants." Jewish
Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 286, -
N.E.2d -, -, - N.Y.S.2d -, - (1975).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. "The Board shall not authorize the issuance of any permit... unless it finds in each case
that the proposed use of the property or the erection, alteration or maintenance of the proposed
building or structure:
a. Will not depredate or tend to depreciate the value of property in the village.
b. Will not create a hazard to health, safety, morals and general welfare, and will not be
detrimental to the neighborhood or to the residents thereof.
c. Will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood.
d. Will not otherwise be detrimental to public convenience and welfare.
* . * Said Board shall also give consideration to the following: Accessibility of the premises for
fire and police protection; . . . traffic problems, transportation requirements and facilities,
hazards from fire .... " Roslyn Harbor, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance § 11-2.30, May 14, 1958.
6. 38 N.Y.2d at 288, - N.E.2d at-, - N.Y.S.2d at-. But see 26 Mo. L. Rev. 45, SO, 53
(1961); 4 Vill. L. Rev. 605, 608 (1959).
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structionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d
283, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1975).
The decision in Roslyn Harbor was grounded on three New York Court of
Appeals cases. 7 In Community Synagogue v. Bates,8 a religious organization
sought to acquire a one family dwelling in a residential area for the purpose of
converting it into a house of worship. The Board of Appeals for the Village of
Sands Point found, inter alia, that the proposed house of worship "would not
conserve values [and] would not promote health, safety, convenience and
welfare . . . ."9 The court of appeals, after examining the record of the board,
found no evidence supporting this proposition and, consequently, overturned
the board's decision. 10 The village had also contended that it could prohibit a
house of worship from locating on a "precise spot." The court considered this
to be the equivalent of allowing a village to designate the "precise spot" on
which a house of worship could be located and held that such a power would
unconstitutionally interfere with free exercise of religion.'"
In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 12 a companion case to Bates,
the planning board's reasons for opposing the construction of a house of
worship were that the area in which the church wanted to build was a highly
7. For lower court New York cases dealing with the conflict between zoning power and free
exercise of religion see Pelham Jewish Center v. Marsh, 10 App. Div. 2d 645, 197 N.Y.S.2d 258
(2d Dep't 1960) (mem.) (village zoning ordinance prohibiting houses of worship in residential
districts held unconstitutional); Garden City Jewish Center v. Incorporated Village of Garden
City, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 155 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (zoning board decision to deny a use
permit to house of worship on grounds that it would depreciate surrounding property and would
be more appropriate on other sites, reversed); North Shore Unitarian Soc'y, Inc. v. Plandome,
200 Misc. 524, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (ordinance which allows public buildings In an
area and excludes houses of worship from the same area is void as it does not promote public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare).
8. 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).
9. Id. at 454, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 22. The Board of Appeals also found that
the proposed house of worship would not conform to the general purpose and intent of the
applicable village law. Id.
10. Id. at 454-55, 136 N.E.2d at 493-94, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23. Even though there was no
extrinsic evidence supporting the board's finding, the court would have accepted the board
members' personal knowledge of facts which would render the construction of the house of
worship undesirable. The record, however, did not disclose any such information. Id.
11. Id. at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26. "We think that we should accept the
fact that we are the successors of 'We, the people' of the Preamble ,to the United States
Constitution and that a court may not permit a municipal ordinance to be so construed that It
would appear in any manner to interfere with the 'free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship'." Id., citing N.Y. Const. art I, § 3: "The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed
in this state . .. ."
Although the state constitution is cited, the court in Roslyn Harbor implied that Bates was also
decided on first amendment federal constitutional grounds. 38 N.Y.2d at 287, - N.E.2d at -,
N.Y.S.2d at -.
12. 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
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developed residential area the character of which would be changed by the
church; the surrounding property values would be adversely affected; the tax
base would be decreased; and traffic problems would be created. 13 The
planning board concluded that the church should be built in a developing,
rather than a developed, area. 14 In rejecting these contentions the court of
appeals established firm rules with respect to the zoning of houses of worship.
The court began with the premise that
a zoning ordinance may not wholly exclude a church or synagogue from any residential
district. Such a provision... bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, peace or general welfare of the community.15
Moreover, a municipality cannot require churches to be built in sparsely
populated areas. 16
The court stated, that in light of the high moral purpose of houses of
worship, potential property value depreciation and tax revenue loss should
not be considered in determining whether to allow a house of worship to
locate in a particular area.' 7 In addition, the issue of traffic hazards was
found to be unpersuasive. It must be noted, however, that this was probably
based on the court's feeling that this issue was raised as an afterthought.' 8
Thus no clear rule emerges as to traffic hazards.
Finally, Rochester established the principle that houses of worship are
inherently beneficial as "clearly in furtherance of the public morals and
general welfare."'19 However, as the court plainly stated: "That is not to say
that appropriate restrictions may never be imposed with respect to a church
13. Id. at 517, 136 N.E.2d at 830, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 854. The planning board's decision did
not mention traffic hazards but the board raised this issue at trial. See note 18 infra.
14. 1 N.Y.2d at 517, 136 N.E.2d at 830, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
15. Id. at 522, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 858. For cases which have adopted the
contrary minority view that houses of worship may be completely excluded from residential areas
see note 39 infra.
16. "'[Wlherever the souls of men are found, there the house of God belongs.'" 1 N.Y.2d at
523, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 860, citing O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App.
45, 51, 105 N.E.2d 917, 920 (1952).
17. 1 N.Y.2d at 524-25, 136 N.E.2d at 835-36, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
18. "Although nothing is mentioned in the planning board's decision about possible traffic
hazards, evidence was presented on this question to that board, and much is made of it in
respondents' answer and brief, apparently by way of afterthought." Id. at 525, 136 N.E.2d at
836, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861. The court also pointed out that unless traffic considerations were
specifically mentioned in the statute, the court would not read such a consideration as validly
incorporated into a general statutory mandate. Id., 136 N.E.2d at 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d at
861-62, citing Small v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938). In Roslyn Harbor, traffic
considerations were specifically mentioned in the statute. See note S supra. The court noted that
several jurisdictions have held that to deny a permit to a church or parochial school because of
the creation of potential traffic hazards is arbitrary and unreasonable. 1 N.Y.2d at 525, 136
N.E.2d at 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 862. However, nowhere in Rochester does the court adopt this
rule for New York.
19. 1 N.Y.2d at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 836-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
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. . . nor is it to say that under no circumstances may they ever be excluded
from designated areas. '20
The third major case considered by the Roslyn Harbor court was Westches-
ter Reform Temple v. Brown.21 Two issues were involved in the attack on a
Scarsdale ordinance: (1) whether the setback requirements applicable to the
expansion of houses of worship were arbitrary and unreasonable, and (2)
whether in determining construction permit grants, the planning board's
compulsory consideration of the ensuing structure's potential for aggravating
a traffic hazard, impairing the use, enjoyment or value of properties in the
surrounding areas, or adversely affecting the prevailing character of the area
was proper. These latter requirements were attacked as infringing on the free
exercise provisions of the state and federal constitutions.
22
The court of appeals held that in light of the special status of houses of
worship-a status which makes them inherently beneficial to the public
welfare-the setback requirements were arbitrary and unreasonable. 23 The
planning commission would have had to show that failure to enforce the
setback requirement would "have a direct and immediate adverse effect upon
the health, safety or welfare of the community." This was not done. 24
As to the second issue, the court stated that, based on its decision in
Rochester,. the right of a municipality to prohibit a house of worship due to
diminution in value, noise or similar inconvenience, and traffic hazards must
always yield to the right to erect a religious structure. 25 The municipality may
only attempt to minimize these detrimental effects. 26
It is submitted that this is a misinterpretation of Rochester. Rochester
merely rules out property devaluation, tax losses, noise and similar inconveni-
ences as factors to be considered in determining zoning decisions as to houses
of worship. Traffic hazards are not directly ruled out. 27 Furthermore, the
Rochester court had explicitly limited its decision by stating that there may
well be circumstances under which houses of worship could be excluded from
designated areas. 28
The Roslyn Harbor majority opinion seems to follow as a natural progres-
sion from Bates, Rochester and Westchester. Insofar as the special use permit
is concerned-since the ordinance directs the zoning board to deny the permit
upon a finding that the "religious use will have any detrimental effect on
public safety, health, or welfare, including effects on traffic, on fire safety,
and on the character of the surrounding neighborhood" 29 -it was, in the
20. Id. This dictum has apparently been ignored in subsequent New York cases. See notes
27-38 infra and accompanying text.
21. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
22. Id. at 492-95, 239 N.E.2d at 894-95, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02.
23. Id. at 494, 239 N.E.2d at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 496-97, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04.
26. Id.
27. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
28. 1 N.Y.2d at 526, 136 NE.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
29. 38 N.Y.2d at 289, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
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court's opinion, unconstitutional on its face. 30 The court looked to Westches-
ter, pointing out that the statutes there were unconstitutional as applied, not
on their face, in that they directed the planning commission to "avoid or
minimize 'insofar as practicable' any detrimental effects." 31 The statute in
Roslyn Harbor, however, did not contain a requirement that efforts to
accommodate or mitigate their negative effects be made. As a result, it served
to "restrict religious uses without recognizing their special, protected status
under the First Amendment. '32
Because the setback requirement was invariable it too had to fall. "There
could well be situations in which no detriment to any aspect of public safety
or welfare would result from a setback of less than 100 feet." 33 Moreover,
there was no hard evidence that traffic hazards or noise-related inconve-
niences to the synagogue's neighbors would result and, in the court's view, no
effort short of complete denial of the variance was made to mitigate these
inconveniences. 34
The village urged that, since only four percent of the members of the house
of worship lived in Roslyn Harbor, the synagogue should bear the burden of
showing other locations to be inadequate. Alternatively, the village argued
that it could exclude the religious use if it could show the inappropriateness of
the chosen location. These considerations were stricken by the court. "[T]he
power to decide where churches may not locate becomes the power to say
where they may do so. That is impermissible. ' 35
The most striking aspect of Roslyn Harbor was its continued acceptance of
the right of a religious group, at its discretion, to convert an existing
residential structure into a house of worship. The court of appeals approv-
ingly cited that part of the Westchester decision which stated that the right to
build a house of worship must win out over considerations of noise and similar
inconveniences to the surrounding area and potential traffic hazards.3 6 The
court went on to state that
[g]iven this record, the question which the village must answer is not whether 29 feet
[the actual setback] is reasonable, but rather, what reasonable measures can be taken
30. Id., - N.E.2d at , N.Y.S.2d at -.
31. Id., - N.E.2d at , N.Y.S.2d at -.
32. Id. at 288, - N.E.2d at-, - N.Y.S.2d at-. However, zoning a house of worship is not
identical to regulating an individual's religious activities. See Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1422-23 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Giannella].
33. 38 N.Y.2d at 289, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -. The Jewish Reconstructionist
Synagogue submitted, along with the request for a variance of the setback requirement for the
estate house, a request for a variance "to accommodate the location of the guest house which wvill
be used to house the congregation's Rabbi. While it presently meets residential requirements,
under the village's zoning ordinances, it becomes an accessory use to the main building and is thus
required to have a larger setback. Our [the court of appeals] rulings with respect to the primary
setback dispute apply with equal force to the guest house setback." Id. at n.2.
34. Id. at 289-90, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
35. Id. at 291, - N.E.2d at -- N.Y.S.2d at -.
36. Id. at 288, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
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to mitigate the effect upon the neighbors of having a synagogue 29 feet from the
property line.
3 7
Thus, with Roslyn Harbor, New York has reinforced its opinion that
houses of worship are a per se benefit to the community and as such,
municipalities can merely tailor zoning ordinances and their application
around a church or synagogue's decision to establish a house of worship. The
decision to establish, itself, may not be negatived by the municipality.
New York's position appears to be unique. 38 States which have confronted
the issue of constitutional limitations on the zoning of houses of worship agree
that a house of worship may not, consistent with the first and fourteenth
amendments, be totally banned from a residential district. 39 However, most
jurisdictions have held that houses of worship are subject to reasonable
zoning regulations. 40
37. Id. at 290, - N.E.2d at-, - N.Y.S.2d at-. It was this "all but conclusive presumption
that considerations of public health, safety and welfare are always outweighed... by the policy
favoring religious structures" which caused Chief Judge Breitel to disagree with the majority. Id.
at 292, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at - (Breitel, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Breitel noted
that there might well be situations in which the public safety and welfare would outweigh the
right of a house of worship to build on a certain location. The facts in Roslyn Harbor, however,
did not present such a situation. Id. at 291-92, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
38. Michigan and Ohio have adopted positions similar to that of New York. See Congrega-
tion Dovid Ben Nuchim v. City of Oak Park, 40 Mich. App. 698, 199 N.W.2d 557 (1972); State
ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 22
Ohio Op. 241, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942); Young Israel Organization v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89,
5 Ohio Op. 2d 387, 133 N.E.2d 174 (1956); State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v.
Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, 55 Ohio Op. 305, 115 N.E.2d 65 (1953).
39. E.g., Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945); City of Englewood v.
Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362 P.2d 172 (1961); Rogers v. Mayor, 110 Ga. App.
114, 137 S.E.2d 668 (1964); Columbus Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Board
of Appeals, 25 Ill. 2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722 (1962); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co.
of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954); Congregation Temple Israel v. City
of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959); Congregation Comm., Jehovah's Witnesses v. City
Council, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). There is, however, a contrary minority view
which holds that a house of worship may be banned entirely from residential districts. E.g.,
Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (2d Dist. 1958), appeal dismissed,
359 U.S. 436 (1959); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (4th Dist.), appeal dismissed, 338
U.S. 805 (1949); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany, Inc. v. City of Miami
Beach, 82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955).
40. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of
Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (4th Dist.), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949);
Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d
880 (Fla. 1955); Rogers v. Mayor, 110 Ga. App. 114, 137 S.E.2d 668 (1964); Columbus Park
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 25 Il1. 2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722
(1962); O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 45, 105 N.E.2d 917 (1952); Board of Zoning
Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954);
Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959); Archdiocese of
Portland v. County of Washington, 254 Ore. 77, 458 P.2d 682 (1969); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's
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The dissent in Roslyn Harbor would have New York adopt such a view. It
asserted that while houses of worship do have a high moral purpose and make
unique contributions to public welfare, "Itihey also bring congestion; they
generate traffic and create parking problems; they can cause a deterioration of
property values in a residential zone; in consequence of customary exemption
from taxation they work an economic disadvantage to taxable properties
.... ,41 While the dissent would not hold religious uses to a standard
identical to that of non-religious uses, it did maintain that regulations which
are sensitively designed to take into account that houses of worship are being
zoned should not be considered "materially [and] adversely [to] affect the full
and free exercise of religious ... freedom."'42 The dissent concluded that the
zoning ordinances and their application were constitutional and reasonable.4 3
The mjority maintained that the dissent's viewpoint presented an incom-
plete picture inasmuch as it failed to recognize the "peculiarly pre-eminent
status of religious institutions under the First Amendment provision for free
exercise of religion ... ."4 The majority implied that the dissents point of view,
in overlooking a first amendment guarantee, would be unconstitutional. In
evaluating the validity of the majority's argument, it is helpful to survey the
decisions of other jurisdictions which maintain that a municipality may place
reasonable zoning restrictions on a house of worship. Three justifications for
these holdings emerge: (1) the court will simply state that houses of worship
are subject to reasonable zoning regulations;4 5 (2) the church involved is a
corporation and is, therefore, subject to reasonable police power regulations;4 6
(3) zoning ordinances which result in reasonable regulation of houses of
Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 359
U.S. 436 (1959); State ex rel Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of
Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957). Giannella, supra note 32, at 1422. For a
general discussion of state court decisions regarding zoning of churches see J. Curry, Public
Regulation of the Religious Use of Land 310-29 (1964).
41. 38 N.Y.2d at 293, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at - (Jones, J., dissenting). The Florida
supreme court has pointed out that the modern church building is used week long as a place of
entertainment and instruction. In light of these activities the court concluded that it would be
constitutionally permissible to exclude houses of worship from residential areas. Miami Beach
United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880, 882 (Fla.
1955). See generally 1 A. Rathkoph, Law of Zoning and Planning, ch. 19 (3d ed. 1974).
42. 38 N.Y.2d at 294, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at - (Jones, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 295, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at - (Jones, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 288, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
45. Rogers v. Mayor, 110 Ga. App. 114, 137 S.E.2d 668 (1964); Columbus Park Congrega-
tion of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 25 II1. 2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722 (1962);
O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Iil. App. 45, 105 N.E.2d 917 (1952); Board of Zoning Appeals v.
Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954); Congregation
Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959); Congregation Comm.,
Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
46. This view is unique to California and is found in the following cases: Minney v. City of
Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (2d Dist. 1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959);
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of
Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (4th Dist.), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
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worship are not prohibited by the first and fourteenth amendments as long as
they do not result in an undue interference with freedom of religion. 47
Jurisdictions which justify their decision by a reliance on the first category
beg the question. It is the universally accepted view that reasonable zoning
ordinances are a valid exercise of the police power. 48 The question to be
answered is whether, and to what extent, this usually valid power is voided
when it conflicts with the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Yet, this
aspect of the problem appears to be ignored by these courts.
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. City of Porterville,4 9 California adopted the second justification." °
When petitioner is a corporation, its existence depends on the state, and it is
subject to reasonable state regulations.5 1 This approach presents obvious
problems. In a given case, the house of worship may not be a corporation, but
rather a sole proprietorship or a partnership. The extent to which a munici-
pality would be prohibited from placing zoning restrictions on a house of
worship in these latter situations is left unanswered. A more basic problem
with the California view, however, is that it fails to resolve the fundamental
problem of determining to what extent the state's usually legitimate power to
regulate corporations is voided when the regulation infringes on free exercise
of religion.
Very few courts have directly addressed the conflict between the free
exercise clause and the power of a state to zone. 52 The Oregon and Wisconsin
supreme courts, 53 through an analysis of United States Supreme Court
decisions on the limits of the free exercise clause, have adopted the undue
influence approach and have reached conclusions similar to the dissent in
Roslyn Harbor.5 4
It has been established that "[l]aws are made for the government of actions,
and while [government] cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, [it] may with practices." 55 Thus, the free exercise clause does not
create a blanket prohibition against government interference with the free
exercise of religion.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,56 the Supreme Court held that a state may not
unduly infringe on free exercise;5 7 and more specifically, the right to preach or
47. Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959); State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v.
Village of Bayside, 12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288 (1961). For a further view that a balancing
standard is favorable to absolute rules of exclusion or nonexclusion see J. Curry, Public
Regulation of the Religious Use of Land 24-49 (1964).
48. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
49. 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (4th Dist.), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
50. This view has been reaffirmed by the California courts. See note 46 supra.
51. 90 Cal. App. 2d at 660, 203 P.2d at 825-26.
52. See 26 Mo. L. Rev. 45, 48 (1961).
53. See note 47 supra.
54. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
55. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
56. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
57. "Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act
1252 [Vol. 44
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disseminate religious views may not be wholly denied by a state.58 But, just
as a state may "regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting
upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon,"5 9 so may the state "in other
respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community,
without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. '60 This view was reasserted in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 61 where it
was contended that the "undoubted" power of the states to promote the
health, safety and general welfare often subject religiously based activities to
state regulation. 62 Thus, in Braunfeld v. Brown, 63 the claim of orthodox Jews
that Sunday dosing laws unduly interfered with their free exercise of religion
was struck down. The laws were heid to be valid exercises of the police
power.64
In light of these Supreme Court decisions, it is safe to say that a reasonable
zoning ordinance which places restrictions on houses of worship is not
unconstitutional provided that the regulations do not unduly infringe on free
exercise. Further, the Court has not taken a restrictive view of regulations
claimed to infringe unduly on free exercise. That a decision to exclude all
churches from a residential area-a move which goes further than the
regulations found unconstitutional in Roslyn Harbor-is not, without more, to
be considered a violation of the free exercise clause is indicated by the decision
in American Communications Association v. Douds.6s There, the Court,
speaking of the Porterville case, 66 wrote:
When the effect of a statute or ordinance upon the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms is relatively small and the public interest to be protected is substantial, it is
obvious that a rigid test requiring a showing of imminent danger to the security of the
Nation is an absurdity. We recently dismissed for want of substantiality an appeal in
which a church group contended that its First Amendment rights were violated by a
must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the
power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe
the protected freedom." Id. at 304 (footnote omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62. Id. at 220.
63. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
64. "To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an
indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the
religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. Statutes
which tax income and limit the amount which may be deducted for religious contributions impose
an indirect economic burden on the observance of the religion of the citizen whose religion
requires him to donate a greater amount to his church; statutes which require the courts to be
closed on Saturday and Sunday impose a similar indirect burden on the observance of the religion
of the trial lawyer whose religion requires him to rest on a weekday. The list of legislation of this
nature is nearly limitless." Id. at 606 (italics omitted).
65. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
66. 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (4th Dist.), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
12531976]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
municipal zoning ordinance preventing the building of churches in certain residential
areas.
67
Thus, it appears that the majority's statement in Roslyn Harbor that "the
question which the village must answer is not whether 29 feet is rtasonable, but
rather, what reasonable measures can be taken to mitigate the effect upon the
neighbors of having a synagogue 29 feet from the property line" 68 is not
constitutionally required by the free exercise clause. Nothing in any Supreme
Court decision indicates that houses of worship are as nearly immune from
government regulation as the Roslyn Harbor majority has indicated. The
minority's view-that municipalities can reasonably regulate houses of wor-
ship, and that these regulations will be upheld as long as the ordinances
themselves or the effect of the ordinances are not arbitrary and unreason-
able-is in fact, constitutionally acceptable. The only limit placed on the
zoning power by the first amendment is that the zoning ordinances either
themselves or as applied, not unduly interfere with the free exercise of
religion.
It is submitted that what is an undue interference with free exercise must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Due to the peculiar factual situations
involved in Bates, Rochester and Westchester, it is likely that even under
such a view, the results would not have been different. In Bates, evidence
was presented that the nearest reformed synagogue was twelve miles away. 69
If the effect of denying the synagogue a permit to build would result in forcing
the members of the house of worship to drive twelve miles to worship, free
exercise of religion may have been unduly infringed. Furthermore, the
village's contention that it could prohibit a house of worship, qua house of
worship, from locating on a "precise spot" 7 0-an issue not present in Roslyn
Harbor-smacks of undue interference.
In Rochester, petitioners alleged that there was only one Catholic church in
Brighton which was inconveniently located and inadequate to serve the needs
of the Catholic community. 7 1 It is not unlikely that the Roslyn Harbor
minority would have found the city's plan to "banish" the church to an
undeveloped part of the city to be an undue interference with free exercise.
Westchester involved an existing house of worship which indisputably had
to be expanded to suit the needs of the congregation. 72 If the planning board's
67. 339 U.S. at 397-98.
68. 38 N.Y.2d at 290, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
69. 1 N.Y.2d at 448, 136 N.E.2d at 490, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
70. Id. at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26; see note 11 supra and accompanying
text.
71. Had the city had its way, the diocese would have been forced to locate in an undeveloped
section of the town and, unless members of the Catholic faith moved to the undeveloped section,
would have been unable adequately to serve the territorial needs of its parishioners. I N.Y.2d at
523, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
72. "It is an undisputed fact and the Planning Commission has so found that the present
facilities must be expanded to meet the increasing needs of the congregation." 22 N.Y.2d at 492,
239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
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scheme were followed, a heavy financial burden would have been placed on
the synagogue. 73 This heavy financial burden may well have been found to
constitute an undue infringement on free exercise.
In Roslyn Harbor, on the other hand, the denial of the permit to build a
house of worship would not make synagogue attendance more difficult and
inconvenient for worshippers.7 4 While conforming with the village's zoning
requirements might well have been expensive, the house of worship, with full
knowledge of the zoning laws of Roslyn Harbor, nevertheless purchased
property within the village and then sought to use the property in contraven-
tion of these laws. 75
In New York, under the doctrine developed in Bates, Rochester, Westches-
ter and Roslyn Harbor, whenever a house of worship challenges a zoning
ordinance, the courts will willingly intervene and place an aura of unconstitu-
tionality around the municipality's zoning ordinances and their application.
7 6
This preemption of the powers and duties of local zoning boards has the effect
of the judiciary making routine decisions about what is in the best interests of
a municipality. 77 It is submitted that this judicial usurpation of local affairs
should only be justified on grounds that there is something inherently uncon-
stitutional about the placing of reasonable zoning requirements on a house of
worship. Indeed, this has been the position adopted by the New York Court
of Appeals. 7 3 It is this presumption of unconstitutionality, however, which
this casenote questions. The courts should limit their review of local zoning
board decisions to a determination of whether the challenged ordinance or the
enforcement of the ordinance is reasonable and if so, whether this otherwise
reasonable regulation represents an undue interference with free exercise.7 9 In
determining reasonableness, the court should ignore the alleged conflict
73. Id. at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
74. "It is conceded that its membership is spread over a fairly wide area surrounding the
Vilage of Roslyn Harbor, and that only 4% of its family members actually live in the
respondent village itself." 38 N.Y.2d at 285-86, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at
75. Id. at 294-95, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at - (Jones, J., dissenting).
76. See notes 7-38 supra and accompanying text.
77. "[I]t must be borne in mind that churches . . . occupy a different status from mere
commercial enterprises and, when the church enters the picture, different considerations apply."
1 N.Y.2d at 523, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 859 (citation omitted).
78. "We have not said that considerations of the surrounding area and potential traffic
hazards are unrelated to the public health, safety or welfare when religious structures are
involved. We have simply said that they are outweighed by the constitutional prohibition against
the abridgement of the free exercise of religion . . . ." 22 N.Y.2d at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 304.
79. See notes 55-68 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the possible interests
that the court might weigh in determining reasonableness see J. Curry, Public Regulation of the
Religious Use of Land 50-70 (1964). "[T]here is neither a set of principles which allocates rules of
decision to particular types of fact situations, nor objective criteria for assigning weights to
religious and governmental interests in various contexts." Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion:
A Sociological Approach, 67 Mlich. L. Rev. 679, 687 (1969); see Clark, Guidelines for the Free
Exercise Clause, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 327, 329 (1969).
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between zoning and free exercise. The ordinance and its application should be
studied solely to determine if it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Once reasonable-
ness is determined, the inquiry should involve a determination of whether,
under the facts of the particular case, free exercise of religion is unduly
infringed. In all other respects the decision as to what zoning restrictions
ought to be placed on houses of worship, as well as the enforcement of these
zoning requirements, should be left to the local municipalities. It is these
bodies, and not the judiciary, in which the legislature has vested the power to
zone.
80
Barry Gene Felder
Labor Law-Third Circuit Holds Impasse in Bargaining Excuses Em-
ployer's Unilateral Withdrawal from Multiemployer Negotiations.-The
employer, Beck Engraving Co., was a member of a multiemployer bargaining
unit composed of the Philadelphia Printing Pressman, Assistants and Offset
Workers Union and the Allied Printing Employer's Association. After negotia-
tions on a new contract had proceeded for several months and a strike had
been in progress for over one month, six of Beck's original seven employees
resigned from the union and returned to work. The seventh employee,
allegedly distraught over the prolonged strike, had committed suicide. At this
point, Beck's president notified the union that it had withdrawn from the
multiemployer association. The union responded that it did not consent to
Beck's withdrawal from the negotiations nor did it consider the withdrawal
timely. When the union and the remaining members of the association
reached a contract, Beck refused to sign it.
Beck argued before the National Labor Relations Board that its withdrawal
was justified on three grounds: that it had a good faith doubt that the union
continued to represent its employees, that the union had consented to the
withdrawal of another employer, and that the union had struck it and other
association members during the negotiations.I The Board found that these
circumstances would not excuse unilateral employer withdrawal from mul-
tiemployer negotiations2 and that Beck's refusal to sign the contract violated
sections 8(a)(1), and 8(a)(5) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act. On a motion
for rehearing before the Board, Beck urged that a bargaining impasse justified
its withdrawal. The motion was denied and the Board petitioned the Third
80. See N.Y. Village Law § 7-700 (McKinney 1973).
1. Beck Engraving Co., 87 L.R.R.M. 1037 (1974), enforcement denied, 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir.
1975).
2. Id. at 1038-39.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed In
section 157 . . . . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
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Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce its order. The court refused, holding that
impasse in bargaining excuses an employer's unilateral withdrawal from
multiemployer negotiations. The court then determined that since at the time
Beck withdrew, lengthy and frequent negotiations had taken place between
the union and the association over a four month period without success, an
impasse had existed and Beck's withdrawal was excused. NLRB v. Beck
Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1975).
Negotiations between employers and unions are often conducted on a
multiemployer bargaining basis.4 The process offers advantages to both labor
and management. It permits a union to save time and money by negotiating
one contract instead of several and also helps achieve its goal of standardiza-
tion of wages and working conditions.5 Moreover, many beneficial employee
programs can be achieved on a multiemployer basis that individual employers
could not provide.
6
Although these features make it attractive to labor, multiemployer bargain-
ing can be a management weapon. The practice offers the individual em-
ployer increased bargaining power in dealing with strong unions. In addition,
since all the employers are bound by a single master contract, they are assured
that their competitors will not enjoy more advantageous terms. 7 The most
significant protection an employer achieves through group bargaining, how-
ever, is the prevention of whipsawing,8 the tactic whereby a union gains
quick concessions by striking an individual employer while his competitors
remain in business. In NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449 (Buffalo Linen),9 the
Supreme Court held that if a multiemployer member is struck, the entire unit
may engage in a lockout10 to protect its interest in group negotiations.
Although the practice of multiemployer bargaining long antedated the
Wagner Act, it did not receive official sanction until the Supreme Court's 1957
4. Multiemployer bargaining is the practice whereby two or more employers, usually in the
same industry, agree to bargain jointly with the union representing their employees. The
employers often form an association which conducts the negotiations on their behalf. See
generally Rains, Legal Aspects and Problems of Multi-Employer Bargaining, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 159
(1954); Comment, The Status of Multiemployer Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 1967 Duke L.J. 558.
5. See Comment, The Status Of Multiemployer Bargaining Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 1967 Duke L.J. 558, 560-61.
6. "TV]elfare benefits such as pension plans, medical payments, and unemployment compen-
sation, as well as industry-wide apprentiLeship and training programs . . . may be desirable
by-products of bargaining on a multiemployer basis." Id. at 561.
7. See Rains, Legal Aspects and Problems of Multi-Employer Bargaining, 34 B.U.L. Rev.
159, 160-62 (1954).
8. For a detailed discussion of the whipsawing process, see Note, The Right to Lock-Out
Where a Union Strikes One Member of a Bargaining Association, 43 Geo. L.J. 426 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as The Right to Lock-Out].
9. 353 U.S. 87 (1957) [hereinafter referred to in text and notes as Buffalo Linen], noted in 57
Colum. L. Rev. 1172 (1957).
10. 353 U.S. at 97. A lockout is the tactic whereby an employer seeks to gain acceptance of its
bargaining demands by closing its doors and refusing to provide work for its employees. See The
Right to Lock-Out, supra note 8, at 426.
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decision in Buffalo Linen. 1 Addressing itself to the question of the NLRB's
right to certify multiemployer units, 12 the Court decided that Congress'
refusal to interfere with multiemployer bargaining at the time of the Taft-
Hartley Amendment debates demonstrated its recognition of multiemployer
bargaining as a "vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of
promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining."' 3
Specifically excluded from consideration in the Supreme Court's decision in
Buffalo Linen was the question of an employer's or union's right to dissolve
the multiemployer unit once it has been established.14 As a result the Board
has formulated its policy toward withdrawals from multiemployer bargaining
without judicial or statutory guidance. In fashioning this policy the Board
was faced with two conflicting interests. Unlike the single employer unit, the
multiemployer unit is based upon the consent of the parties' 5 so withdrawal
from these units must be permitted. A too liberal withdrawal policy, however,
would conflict with the Act's fundamental purpose of promoting stability in
bargaining relationships.' 6
An attempt at achieving a balance of these interests was evidenced in the
Board's decision in Evening News Association, 17 that unions and employers
should have equal withdrawal rights. ' 8 Since a union's withdrawal is likely to
have a more dramatic effect on the viability of a multiemployer unit than a
single employer's withdrawal, the decision has been criticized as promoting
needless instability in multiemployer bargaining. 19 In the Board's view,
however, even greater instability would be caused by having unions locked
into the multiemployer unit against their will.20
11. 353 U.S. at 94.
12. There are no statutory provisions providing for multiemployer bargaining. The Board
derived its power to certify multiemployer units from 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970) which provides:
"The Board shall decide in each case whether .. . the unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof ...."
The Board reads this section in conjunction with 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) which defines
employer as including the "agent of an employer." The Board considers the multiemployer
association to be the agent of each of its members, thus permitting it to exercise its power under
section 159(b) to certify an "employer" unit as appropriate for bargaining.
13. 353 U.S. at 95.
14. Id. at 94 n.22.
15. NLRB v. Central Plumbing Co., 492 F.2d 1252, 1255 (6th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Sklar,
316 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1963). Such consent is important since the Board considers bargaining
as being determinative of the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. See Continental Baking Co,,
99 N.L.R.B. 777, 784 (1952).
16. Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958).
17. 154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enforced sub nom., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v.
NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967).
18. Id. at 1499.
19. Id. at 1504 (Member Brown dissenting). See also Comment, The Status of Multiemployer
Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1967 Duke L.J. 558, 589-92; 41 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 651 (1966).
20. 154 N.L.R.B. at 1499. A union locked into a multiemployer bargaining group would have
no choice but to engage in conduct aimed at causing employer withdrawals. Therefore, the Board
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The union's equality of withdrawal rights was further strengthened and
clarified in Pacific Coast Association of Pulp and Paper Manufacturers,21
wherein the Board held that a union may withdraw from multiemployer
bargaining with respect to one or more employers while continuing bargaining
with the remaining members of the group. 22 Although it was argued that such
a rule permits the union to determine unilaterally the scope of the bargaining
unit, the Board declared that if the employers "believe that the employer with
respect to whom the union has withdrawn is so vital to the multiemployer
unit that multiemployer bargaining is no longer desirable, they may them-
selves withdraw .... '23 Therefore, in the Board's view, permitting the union
to withdraw selectively would not destroy the policy favoring equality of
withdrawal rights.
Although the Evening News Association and Pacific Coast Association
decisions assure that employers and unions will have equal rights to withdraw
from multiemployer bargaining, neither may do so without complying with
Board rules as to the time and manner of withdrawal. These rules were first
enunciated in Retail Associates Inc. ,24 where the NLRB held that prior to the
start of negotiations either an employer or a union may withdraw unilater-
ally-without the consent of the other party-simply by giving written
notice. 25 Once negotiations on a new contract have begun, however, neither
party may withdraw unless there is mutual consent 26 or, in the Board's
opinion, unusual circumstances exist which would excuse an untimely with-
drawal. The exception for unusual circumstances has been limited by the
Board to two basic situations. First, unusual circumstances have been found
to exist where an employer's business has in the course of negotiations
reasoned that "[i]nequality of freedom to withdraw thus could become a means of producing, not
stability, but friction and instability in the bargaining unit." Id.
21. 163 N.L.R.B. 892 (1967) [hereinafter referred to in text and notes as Pacific Coast
Association].
22. Id. at 895.
23. Id. at 896.
24. 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958).
25. The Board has since stated that the notice must be written. Evening News Ass'n, 154
N.L.R.B. 1482, 1483 (1965), enforced sub nom., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v.
N.L.R-B., 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967). However, it appears that actual notice to the other party
is sufficient. See Imperial Outdoor Advertising, 192 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1971), enforced, 470 F.Zd
484 (8th Cir. 1972) (oral notice when conveyed in person to the union representative found to
constitute an effective withdrawal).
26. "Mutual consent" appears to require the consent of the union, the employer, and the
multiemployer association. See NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 478 (1975). It is
important to note that such consent may be express or implied. See, e.g., I.C. Refrigeration
Service, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 687 (1972), where the Board stated "acquiescence exists where a union
engages in separate negotiations with a withdrawing employer, listens to counterproposals, and
agrees to make certain concessions not offered the association." Id. at 690. Accord, Hartz-
Kirkpatrick Constr. Co., 195 N.L.R1B. 863 (1972) (offer of terms not in the multiemployer
contract). See also Site-Con Indus., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 46 (1972) (failure to object to the
exclusion of employer's name from list of bargaining group members constitutes union acqui-
escence to his withdrawal).
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suffered an extreme financial setback, threatening its viability as a functioning
enterprise. Thus, an employer whose financial distress was forcing him to
move his business out of New York City was permitted to withdraw, 2 7 as was
an employer whose business underwent a reorganization in bankruptcy.2 8 The
second situation where the Board recognizes unusual circumstances is when
the bargaining unit itself has been dissipated by consensual employer with-
drawals during the course of bargaining. In one case where the union had
consented to deal separately with twenty-three of thirty-six employers engaged
in multiemployer negotiations, the Board found that the bargaining unit was so
fragmented that it would be "unfair and harmful to the collective-bargaining
process" to refuse to permit the remaining employers to withdraw. 29 Absent
such extreme circumstances, the Board has consistently refused to permit
withdrawals once multiemployer negotiations are underway. Although the
Retail Associates rule has been criticized as overly rigid, 30 the Board's
judgment that it is necessary to preserve stability in the multiemployer
bargaining situation 31 has generally been supported by the courts. 32
While the Retail Associates rule strictly limits the right of withdrawal
during negotiations, unions often engage in what amounts to a withdrawal
during bargaining through the process of offering individual contracts to
members of the multiemployer group. In Ice Cream Council, Inc. ,33 the
Board held that a union did not violate the Act by entering into individual
agreements with multiemployer bargaining group members. 34 Since there was
27. Spun-Jee Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557 (1968).
28. U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 730 (1968).
29. Connell Typesetting Co., 87 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1004 (1974). See also NLRB v. Southwest-
ern Colorado Contractors Ass'n, 447 F.2d 968, 969 (10th Cir. 1971) (employers relieved of their
duty to bargain in a multiemployer unit that had been reduced from fifteen to five employers).
30. See NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1966) (Lumbard, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967) (withdrawals should be permitted at any time
absent bad faith or harm to the collective bargaining process). See also Comment, Withdrawal
From Multi-Employer Bargaining-Reconsidering Retail Associates, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 464
(1967); Note, Labor Law-Employer and Union Withdrawal From Multi-Employer Collective
Bargaining, 12 N.Y.L.F. 484, 500 (1966).
31. In Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958), the Board stated that the timing
of attempted withdrawals from multiemployer bargaining is "an important lever of control in the
sound discretion of the Board to insure stability of such bargaining relationships."
32. The Second Circuit was the first court to adopt the Retail Associates rule. NLRB v.
Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); accord,
NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968). The rule was also followed in
NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, Inc., 442 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1971) and Universal Insulation
Corp. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1966). But see NLRB v. Unelco Corp., 83 L.R.R.M.
2447 (7th Cir. 1973) (withdrawal during negotiations would be permissible because of conflict of
interest between the employer and other members of the multiemployer group) (dictum); NLRB
v. Field & Sons, Inc., 462 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1972) (by analogy to a union member's right to
withdraw from the union even after voting to strike, a multiemployer group member should be
free to withdraw before a contract is reached absent detriment or bad faith) (dictum).
33. 145 N.L.R.B. 865 (1964).
34. Id. at 870.
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an impasse in negotiations, the Board found that the employer could, if the
union agreed, execute an individual contract.3 S
Similar to the union tactic of negotiating separate contracts with mul-
tiemployer group members is the negotiation of "interim agreements." 36 Such
agreements are usually entered into after a union has struck members of a
multiemployer bargaining unit. The employer accepting the interim pact
agrees in advance to the demands the union is making in the negotiations with
the stipulation that he will remain bound by whatever contract is ultimately
reached with the association. 37 In one recent case, a struck multiemployer
group member, dissatisfied with the delay in his work schedule, purportedly
solicited such an agreement with the union. 38 The Trial Examiner expressed
the view that the individual employer "could not validly negotiate separately
. . . as it did and reach agreement pursuant to which it alone of the
multiemployer group resumed work to the obvious, disadvantage of the other
members of the group."' 39 The Board, however, disagreed, finding that the
execution of the individual agreements did not have "a significantly adverse
impact upon the integrity of the multiemployer bargaining unit." 40 Unlike the
individual contracts in Ice Cream Council, such "interim agreements" do not
appear to require impasse in negotiations41 or actual withdrawal by the
defecting employer from the multiemployer group. 42
35. Id. This practice of offering multiemployer group members completely individual con-
tracts should be distinguished from the type of limited individual bargaining sanctioned by the
Board in The Kroger Co., 148 N.L.RtB. 569, 575, enforced sub nom. Retail Clerks Union v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828 (1964) wherein the Board held that
an employer could insist on dealing with the union singly on matters of specialized concern to
him. But see Springfield Electrotype Serv., Inc., 166 N.L.RB. 639, 648 (1967) (union effort to
negotiate singly on matters of substantial economic importance held not within the Kroger
exception).
36. "Interim agreement" apparently has no fixed meaning. In addition to the type of interim
agreement discussed in the text, such an agreement may simply obligate the multiemployer
member in advance to accept without reservation the multiemployer contract. See NLRB v.
Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 367 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1966). In such a case it is no more than a
formality, since multiemployer members are normally bound by the product of group negotia-
tions. Contracts by which an employer who is not a member of a multiemployer association binds
himself in advance to the contract reached by the association are also termed interim agreements.
The Board has held that these blank check agreements are enforceable. See Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n, 144 N.L.R.B. 773 (1963).
37. See, e.g., Plumbers Union No. 323, 191 N.L.R.B. 592 (1971) (employer agrees to wage
demand, not acceptable to the association).
38. Sangamo Construction Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 159, 160 (1971).
39. Id.
40. Id. The Board's reasoning apparently was that since there was no finding that Sangamo's
agreement to grant retroactive wage increases had any influence on the association's finally
agreeing to that term, and since Sangamo was ultimately bound by the association contract, the
union's conduct did not rise to the level of a violation of the Act.
41. Although in Sangamo the Board did not discuss the question of impasse, it found that
"bargaining did continue during the operative period." Id.
42. See Plumbers Union No. 323, 191 N.L.R.B. 592, 593 n.11 (1971).
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The Board's policy of permitting unions to execute separate agreements
during the course of multiemployer negotiations undoubtedly undermines the
goals of the employer association. The individual employer who agrees to a
separate contract or "interim agreement" weakens the strength of the associa-
tion. In addition, as his employees return to work, pressure is brought to bear
on the remaining employers to accede to the union's demands or face
competitive disadvantage. The resulting whipsaw effect on the multiemployer
association leaves it with considerably less bargaining power. In light of these
considerations, a question has arisen as to the rights of the employers with
whom the union does not negotiate separately. Do they have the option to
withdraw from the multiemployer unit or does the Retail Associates rule still
operate to preclude their withdrawal once negotiations have begun, absent
union consent or "unusual circumstances"?
The Eighth Circuit considered this question in Fairmont Foods Co. v.
NLRB .43 Fairmont had attempted to withdraw from a multiemployer associa-
tion after participating in negotiations. The Board determined that there was
no union consent to the withdrawal and ordered Fairmont to sign the
contract. 44 The court refused to enforce the Board's order on the grounds
inter alia that it was "particularly incongruous" that the Board had not found
union consent to Fairmont's withdrawal in light of the fact that the union had
executed separate contracts with members of the multiemployer association,
and such an agreement was the basis for withdrawing pickets from one
employer's premises. 45
In NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 46 the Fifth Circuit was faced with
the similar situation of an employer claiming the right to withdraw after
negotiations had begun on a multiemployer basis. In its first decision in the
Hi-Way Billboards case, the Board had rejected the employer's contention
that the union's entering into separate contracts with other members of the
employer group justified his belated withdrawal. 4 7 When the Board petitioned
the Fifth Circuit for enforcement, the court reversed the Board's factual
finding that no impasse was reached during the negotiations, 48 and remanded
the case to the Board to consider whether an impasse was an "unusual
circumstance" under the Retail Associates rule so as to validate Hi-Way's
otherwise unlawful withdrawal. 49 On remand, the Board unanimously held
43. 471 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1972).
44. Fairmont Foods Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 849, enforcement denied, 471 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir.
1972). The Board majority considered that affirmative conduct was necessary by the union to
indicate their consent to the withdrawal. Id. Chairman Miller, however, argued that the union's
silence under the circumstances amounted to consent. Id. at 850. See note 26 supra.
45. 471 F.2d at 1174 n.1.
46. 473 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1973).
47. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 244, 245 (1971), enforcement denied, 473 F.2d
649 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. 473 F.2d at 654-55.
49. Id. In Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1972), the court held that
impasse excused unilateral withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining relying on the Board's
decision in Morand Bros. Bev. Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), enforced, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.
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that impasse was not an "unusual circumstance" but "merely a momentary
eddy in the flow of collective bargaining" and that it would "herald the demise
of multiemployer bargaining" if an employer were permitted to seize upon the
occurrence of impasse as grounds for withdrawal from the multiemployer
unit.50 Therefore, in the Board's view, impasse alone, without union consent,
does not relieve an employer from his obligation to remain in the bargaining
unit once negotiations have begun and to be bound by the resulting contract.
When the case returned to the Fifth Circuit, the court, while acknowledg-
ing the "cogency of the Board's reasoning" on the impasse question,"' again
refused to enforce the Board's order. The court reasoned that the Pacific
Coast Association decision S2 which gave unions the right to withdraw with
respect to one or more employers while continuing bargaining on a mul-
tiemployer basis with the remaining members of the unit, would result in an
unfair whipsaw effect on the remaining employers. s 3 In the original proceed-
ing in Hi-Way Billboards,54 the employer had argued before the Board that
the Pacific Coast Association decision justified its withdrawal. The Board
rejected this contention pointing out that the Pacific Coast Association rule
involved a timely partial withdrawal by a union, that is, one made before the
start of negotiations, and that it was implicit in that decision that any
employer withdrawals without union consent must also be timely.5s The
Pacific Coast Association decision does not lead to a whipsaw effect since the
union's withdrawals under that rule are made at a time when the employer is
free to withdraw as well. The Fifth Circuit did not comment on this
interpretation of the Board's Pacific Coast Association rule but apparently
relied on the implicit holding in the Board's original decision, 56 that while the
union was permitted to enter into separate contracts during negotiations,
Hi-Way did not get a correlative right to withdraw at that point.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hi-Way Billboards was followed by the
Ninth Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co." The
employer in that case contended before the Board that his withdrawal in the
midst of negotiations was permitted because, after impasse was reached, the
union had entered into separate contracts with members of the multiemployer
1951). This case predated the rules laid down in Retail Associates and it is the Board's position
that it is no longer valid. See NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir.
1974).
50. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973), enforcement denied, 500 F.2d 181
(5th Cir. 1974).
51. NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1974). The court
expressed the opinion that the Board's decision protected the interests of employees and unions
but was "unfair" to the employer. Id. at 184.
52. 163 N.L.R.B. 892 (1967); see notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
53. 500 F.2d at 183.
54. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 244 (1971).
55. Id. at 245.
56. The Board accorded no significance to the separate agreements, simply pointing out that
since Hi-Way's withdrawal occurred after negotiations had begun, it was untimely. Id.
57. 512 F.2d 230 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. CL 191 (1975).
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group.5 8 The majority of the Board took the position that the fact that some
employers had abandoned multiemployer bargaining by accepting the sepa-
rate contracts did not show that the union had abandoned the multiemployer
unit.5 9 In a concurring opinion, 60 however, Chairman Miller stated that the
union's conduct in forcing the separate contracts on bargaining group mem-
bers showed acquiescence by the union to a specific withdrawal or breakup of
the unit.61 Although enforcing the Board's order on other grounds, 62 the
Ninth Circuit agreed with Miller's conclusion commenting that "when an
impasse is reached and a union . . . enters into substantial individual
agreements with employers who had been members of the multiemployer
unit, the withdrawal of the remaining members . . . should be permitted." 63
The court thought that if the employers could not withdraw under such
circumstances, the union could effectively whipsaw the members with whom
it did not negotiate individually. 64
In NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 65 the Third Circuit referred to the prior
court decisions in Fairmont, Hi-Way Billboards, and Associated Shower Door
as formulating what it termed the "impasse doctrine." 6 6 The phrase seems
inapposite since these cases were not concerned with the occurrence of
impasse itself as providing grounds for unilateral withdrawal. Rather they
expanded the right of an employer to exercise a lawful withdrawal from
multiemployer negotiations when a union has entered into separate agree-
ments with members of the bargaining unit.67 Similarly, the Third Circuit's
decision in Beck that the employer's unilateral withdrawal was permitted at
impasse was dictated by the Board's policy of permitting these separate
negotiations.
The employer in Beck had not raised before the Board the issue of impasse
as excusing his untimely withdrawal until his motion for reconsideration by
the Board. 68 The Third Circuit, however, noting the recent "impasse doc-
trine" decisions, held that the issue was not waived. The court then deter-
mined that the Board's policy of permitting individual interim agreements 69
58. Associated Shower Door Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 677 (1973), enforced, 512 F.2d 230(9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 191 (1975).
59. 205 N.L.R.B. at 677.
60. The entire Board panel agreed that Associated had later reentered the multiemployer unit
and thus had agreed to be bound by the contract, Id.
61. Id. The majority held that Chairman Miller's rationale for finding that the multiemployer
unit was destroyed by the union's conduct was an "entirely novel theory without support in Board
or court decisions."
62. The court accepted the Board's factual conclusion that Associated had reentered the
bargaining unit. 512 F.2d at 233.
63. Id. at 232.
64. Id.
65. 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 479 n.8.
67. See notes 43-64 supra and accompanying text.
68. 522 F.2d at 478-79.
69. Although the court spoke specifically of "interim agreements," it is submitted that the
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"strengthens the union's hand" against the remaining employers and
amounted to the "rejection of the existence" of multiemployer bargaining." °
Therefore, the court held that the Board's approval of this union tactic
justified the granting of an "equivalent right" to the employer, that is,
unilateral withdrawal at impasse.
7
'
The significant factual difference between the Beck case and the prior
"impasse doctrine" cases was that the union in Beck had not engaged in
separate bargaining. The court, however, reasoned that "[t]he employer's
right to withdraw during a bargaining impasse cannot be made contingent upon
the union's prior exercise of its right to negotiate individual interim agree-
ments."7 2 The court concluded that to avoid giving an unfair advantage to
either party, the employer's right to withdraw and the union's right to engage
in separate bargaining, must accrue at the same time, i.e., at impasse. 73 The
court then reviewed the history of the negotiations in Beck and concluded that
they presented "a portrait of impasse" excusing Beck's unilateral withdraw-
al.
7 4
The Third Circuit's decision in Beck that impasse alone should be the
standard for withdrawal from multiemployer negotiations represents an ex-
pansion of the "impasse doctrine" beyond the circumstances that led to its
formulation. It can hardly be doubted that the Board's policy with regard to
the making of separate agreements tends to favor the union. The Board
apparently views these separate contracts as a bargaining weapon that the
union may utilize, without leading to the accrual of new withdrawal rights on
the part of the remaining employers,7 S provided that the contracts are not
entered into on such a scale that the multiemployer unit is fragmented.7 6 The
court's finding would be the same if the type of separate contract made in Ice Cream Council
were at issue. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text. The same whipsaw effect is possible
with both types of agreements. See Connell Typesetting Co., 87 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1004 (1974), where
the Board refused to distinguish between interim agreements and separate contracts in finding
that a multiemployer unit was no longer viable because of the fragmenting effect they engen-
dered.
70. 522 F.2d at 483.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 483-84.
74. Id. at 484.
75. The Board's position can perhaps be defended by the language of the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965). In that case the Board had decided that employers
engaged in a multiemployer lockout could not hire replacements to continue in business during
the strike. The Board's reasoning was that the hiring of replacements greatly increased the
employer's bargaining power and was not aimed exclusively at protecting the multiemployer unit
from whipsawing. Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73, 75 (1962). The Tenth Circuit refused to
enforce the Board's decision in NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), and the Supreme
Court affirmed concluding that the Board should not become the "arbiter of the sort of economic
weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands." 380 U.S.
at 283, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497 (1960).
76. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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belief that the Board's position was unfair and not any conviction that
impasse is an appropriate time to permit unilateral withdrawals from mul-
tiemployer negotiations, led the courts considering this problem prior to Beck
to conclude that the employer must be given the option to withdraw whenever
such separate agreements are executed. 77
The articulation of the "impasse doctrine" in Beck, however, may create
more serious problems in the multiemployer situation than it solves. Instead
of tying the employer's right to unilaterally withdraw to the occurrence of
some identifiable conduct on the part of the union (the making of separate
agreements), the Third Circuit would permit withdrawals whenever impasse
is reached in the bargaining.78 In its decision on this subject, the Board
unanimously concluded that such a standard for withdrawal "would effec-
tively negate the benefits of [multiemployer bargaining] to all parties. '79 The
Board's reasoning was that impasse is a normal phase in negotiations during
which the parties resort to economic weapons to establish the primacy of their
bargaining positions, and not an end to bargaining.8" Impasse as a standard
for withdrawal would also lead to confusion as to the rights of the parties,
since there is no set formula for determining when genuine impasse has
occurred. 8 ' In addition, the court's view that impasse is an event which
"neither [party] can manipulate" 82 neglects the fact that impasse is often only
avoided by the parties' willingness to compromise. Such compromises will not
be encouraged if the parties, particularly employers in multiemployer bargain-
ing who often have differing economic interests, see impasse as an event that
will permit them to avoid 83 or at least delay reaching an unfavorable
agreement.
In a footnote to its decision in Beck, the court suggested that the ultimate
policy judgments in the multiemployer area should be left to the Board, and
its decision was aimed solely at redressing what it perceived as an imbalance
created by the Board's policy of permitting the separate contracts.8 4 In future
decisions on this question the Board hopefully will be guided by the view
advanced by Chairman Miller in Associated Shower Door, Inc. that the
77. See NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 191 (1975); NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1974);
Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1174 n.1 (8th Cir. 1972).
78. 522 F.2d at 483.
79. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973).
8o. Id.
81. "The Board has never defined with any precision the means by which it finds parties at an
impasse. Its common decisional method is to list a variety of factors it finds in the record and then
conclude, abruptly, that the parties were at an impasse. . . . Closer examination of the cases
shows that the finding of impasse comes close to being a visceral reaction of the trial examiner
and the Board to the record." Stewart & Engeman, Impasse, Collective Bargaining and Action,
39 U. Cin. L. Rev. 233, 241 (1970).
82. 522 F.2d at 483.
83. The court found that Beck had no duty to negotiate with the union on an individual basis
after its withdrawal because it had "a good faith doubt as to the majority status of the union
among its employees." Id. at 485.
84. Id. at 484 n.15.
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making of such agreements constitutes implied union acquiescence to employer
withdrawals from the multiemployer negotiations."5 Since multiemployer
bargaining is based on consent of the parties, it seems illogical to view this
consent as continuing when a union has changed the scope of the unit by its
voluntary conduct during negotiations. This is especially true since many
employers are willing to engage in multiemployer bargaining only because of
the increased bargaining power and freedom from competitively disadvan-
tageous terms that result from bargaining in an expanded unit. Such a holding
would answer much of the courts' criticism of the Board's position and
effectively avoid the destabilizing effect of the solution advanced by the Third
Circuit in Beck. The Third Circuit was correct in its conclusion that the
Board should not have given unions "two weapons for its economic arsenal
(i.e., the selective strike and individual negotiations) while the employers are
given only one (viz., the lockout).18 6 However, the ultimate solution of the
problem should be aimed at maintaining as far as possible the stability of the
multiemployer unit, which has proven advantageous to both employers and
employees, rather than creating increasing opportunities for its dissolution.
Carol A. McCarthy
85. 205 N.L.R.B. 677 (1973); see notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
86. 522 F.2d at 483.
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